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Introduction
The law, it seems, is an experienced and eager traveler. As far as we
can look, the migration of legal concepts, practices, and institutions has
been a commonplace occurrence all around the world: from the "reception"
of Roman law in medieval Germany to the spread of German Begriffsjurisprudenz to places as far away as Japan or as alien as the Soviet Union; from
America's constitutional exports to the defeated countries after World War
II to the large-scale transfer of Western legal knowhow to the post-socialist
countries of Eastern Europe. We will not find a legal system anywhere in
the developed world that has not borrowed from another country's laws.
That much is undisputed.'
What comparative lawyers disagree about, however, is what forces propel those borrowings and-my topic in this essay-what happens to the
borrowed laws and institutions as they are planted into foreign soil. On the
far side of the debate, doctrinalists like Alan Watson see no problem with
exporting law from one historical period to another or from one country to
the next. Watson believes that law is not the natural outgrowth of a particular society, but the intellectual creation of clever lawyers,easily adaptable
to local use by other clever lawyers elsewhere on the globe. What travels in
the case of legal exports like those now washing over Eastern Europe are
the "ideas" 2 of experts: technical solutions that, like a hammer, one can put
into a suitcase and take out wherever one would want to bang a nail into
the wall. At the other end of the spectrum, post-modern scholars like
Pierre Legrand reject the notion that legal transplants can successfully take
root in foreign soil. According to this view, not just the law is socially
determined, but also our thinking about the law: the interpretation of legal
T Friends of Jamail Regents' Chair in Law, The University of Texas. I owe thanks
to my colleagues Leif Clark and Jay Westbrook for helpful conversations about
bankruptcy.
1. See generally THE

RECEPTION OF CONTINENTAL IDEAS IN THE COMMON LAW WORLD,

1820-1920 (Mathias Reimann, ed., 1993); ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS, AN
APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (2d ed. 1993); G. Adjani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal
Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995).
2. See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79, 79

(1976).
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rules is "a function of the interpreter's epistemological assumptions, which
are themselves historically and culturally conditioned."'3 As a result, even
those legal exports that appear to flourish in another legal culture must
have fundamentally changed in character: the meaning of a legal rule "does
not survive the journey from one legal system to another. ' 4 And in
between these two extreme positions, legal sociologists like Lawrence
Friedman explain the law's migrations with the very fact that it is socially
determined. Friedman, sees spreading modernity as the cause for successful transfers between otherwise profoundly dissimilar legal cultures. As
modern industry, international trade, and global communications expand
into the Second and Third World, traditional societies will experience legal
problems that increasingly resemble those faced by the more advanced
economies. 5 To address these problems, both developing and advanced
despite the fact that their
countries will use solutions that are very similar
6
respective legal histories are worlds apart.
In this essay, I want to look at the viability of legal transfers from Western capitalist countries to the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The
difficulty is that post-socialist attempts to establish a rule of law do not
quite fit the picture of spreading modernity described by Friedman. Most
Eastern European law reforms, now undertaken in the reformers' hope of
joining Europe, are not the consequence of social change. Rather, their
purpose is to bring about that change, or to facilitate and speed up change
that, in many instances, had been unleashed by reckless and abrupt privatizations. In this scenario, law is assigned the role of independent rather
than dependent variable. Like Alan Watson's technical devices designed
by legal experts (and in line with the old Soviet view of law as a "lever" or a
"tool" for social change), new legal rules shall give rise to new institutions,
practices, and convictions in the new democracies. Will they?
My paper will not look for a universally applicable answer to this question. Instead, I will, more modestly, consider existing instances of legal
transplants in order to discover patterns of success or failure. Such patterns, in turn, might explain why some legal transplants take while others
don't. Since patterns are the sum of many individual traits, my paper will
be focused on the particular rather than the general. With luck, a pattern,
once established, may also reveal the outlines of a theory. At this point,
though, I simply want to know whether a particular legal innovation carries within itself the indication of its likely outcome: whether by looking at
a reform proposition, we can say, "hmmm, that probably will or will not
work," and articulate the reasons behind our suspicion.
3. Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of "Legal Transplants," 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. &
CoMP. L. 111, 114 (1997).

4. Id. at 117.
5. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Thoughts on the Rule of Law, Legal Culture, and
Modernity in Comparative Perspective, in TOWARD COMPARATIVE LAW INTHE 21ST CENTURY

1075 (Institute of Comparative Law in Japan ed., 1998).
6. See id. at 1075-76.
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In a recent article called "The Transplant Effect,"' 7 Daniel Berkowitz,
Katharina Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard have examined the fate of legal
borrowings by comparing "levels of legality" achieved over the last two
hundred years in forty-nine different countries. All of the countries in their
sample either developed their legal systems through internal law creation
(the "origins")8 or through the importation of another nation's law (the
"transplants"). Based on their regression analysis, the authors concluded
that the effectiveness of legal transplants is determined by the lawmaking
9
process itself, rather than by the contents of the rules transplanted. Voluntary reforms initiated by the receiving countries ("receptive transplants")
are more successful than reforms imposed by outside forces ("unreceptive
transplants"). 10
The authors' result seems plausible with or without the underpinnings
of regression analysis. Countries that had their legal systems forced upon
them tend to be in worse shape than countries capable of self-initiated law
reform. But this insight is not particularly helpful in the case of Eastern
Europe. For one, the authors' units of comparison-"legal systems,"
imposed upon in toto, or accepted by another country like an entire wardrobe from the rack-do not capture the current process of law reform in
Eastern Europe. With the exception of East Germany, which upon reunification adopted the legal system of the Federal Republic literally overnight,
post-socialist countries tend to mix and match their legal borrowings,
importing, for instance, many of the requirements of the acquis communautairefrom Europe, taking advice on corporate or financial legislation
from the United States, and listening to voices at home in matters affecting
distributional or political issues. Moreover, the authors' notion of "receptive transplants" assumes that the effectiveness of borrowed law depends
upon its willing acceptance by the law's addressees in the receiving country. But this seems too romantic a view of current lawmaking in Eastern
Europe, where democratically elected governments are eagerly adopting
the law reforms that will ensure their entry into Europe, while disaffected
populations stand aside and grumble. And finally, the authors' measuring
stick for the effectiveness of legal imports-national "levels of legality"presupposes a uniformity of success or failure that does not correspond to
the Eastern European legal landscape, in which some transplants miraculously thrive (like the new constitutional courts), while others do not take
at all. It is the very individual question-will this work?-that hovers over
every instance of legal borrowing and requires an answer that must be as
specific and concrete as possible.
This essay proposes some rules of thumb for judging whether a particular legal transplant is likely to succeed. Given the complexity of the issues
involved, these suggestions are offered as speculations rather than predic7.
Effect,
8.
9.
10.

See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant
51 Am.J. CoMP. L. 163 (2003).
See id. at 172-79.
See id. at 189.
See id. at 179-80.
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tions. Think of this piece as a horticultural thought exercise: A gardener
selecting a particular plant at a nursery considers the quality of her garden's soil, the plant's future exposure to sun and wind, its proximity to
other plants, and similar factors when she makes her choice. Can a law
reformer proposing the transfer of a particular solution from one country
to another choose a legal rule in an equally deliberate and rational fashion?

I.

Varieties of Transplants

It seems that Alan Watson may, at times, be right about the ease of
legal transfers. Some legal innovations work indeed like clever mechanical
contraptions that the law reformer can pack into a suitcase and unpack
where needed. For instance, certain rules of election law such as the "five
percent clause" or parliamentary devices such as the "constructive vote of
no confidence" (both of German origin) have either been borrowed at the
outset of East European constitution making" or, as in the case of Bulgaria, have been added later when problems arose that could be solved by
their adoption. t 2 But it is not their technical ingenuity that makes these
rules so universally useful. Rather, these rules transfer easily because they
do not need popular approval or compliance to gain effect. Take another
legal proposition that has traveled like wildfire through Eastern Europe: the
abolition of the death penalty. Unlike the "constructive vote of no confidence," this proposition does not take its strength from the cleverness of
experts but from a society's basic moral principles. One would assume
that legal culture plays an important role in its acceptance or rejection. But
while you need legislative approval to repeal the death penalty, you do not
need public compliance. The hurdles to abolition lie in parliament, not
among the people. Since renouncing the death penalty is a prerequisite for
joining the European Union (EU), 13 Eastern European parliaments have
been eager to comply with a reform requirement that at very little cost can
signal their political maturity. Like their Western European role models,
they have done so in the face of a strong public preference for retaining
capital punishment. 14 But as in the case of electoral reform, the public, in
this case, cannot avoid, bypass, or undercut by daily acts of disassociation
and defiance a liberalization of which it does not approve. No administrator needs to worry about the hangman going it alone. With luck, the public may eventually come around to share the abolitionists' convictions, as it
11. The Polish Constitution of 1997 (in Article 158) and the Slovenian Constitution
of 1992 (in Article 116), for instance, contain rules on a constructive vote of no confidence. The Czech Election Law of 1990 (in Article 42) requires political parties to
receive at least 5% of the vote to be represented in the legislature.
12. See Constitution Watch/Bulgaria (2002), 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV. No. 3, at 10-11.
13. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Protocol No. 6, Apr. 28, 1983, 212 U.N.T.S. 262.
14.

See, e.g., Alexander S. Mikhlin, THE DEATH PENALTY IN RUSSIA 171 (1999) (report-

ing that in Russia, only 6.6% of the population favors the complete abolition of the
death penalty).
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did in Germany.' 5 But it will not matter if that does not happen. In the
case of self-executing law reforms, 16transplanting legal rules seems indeed,
as Watson claims, "socially easy."'
2. Most law reform, however, requires the cooperation of its citizenry
to be effective. Since the law's addressees are embedded in their specific
legal systems, cultural dissonances between the donor and the recipient
country may prevent a transplant from taking root. This seems least likely
to occur in situations where a borrowed legal institution or procedure adds
a component to a legal system that is not only new, but also self-contained-that is, where an innovation can largely function without the help
or sustenance of the legal system into which it has been introduced. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) of business conflicts may serve as an
example: a novel legal commodity successfully exported by its mostly
American proponents to many countries around the world. 17 ADR is easy
to sell because it does not need to mesh with the purchasing country's own
legal system. True to its name, it serves as an alternative to whatever dispute resolving mechanisms are locally available. in the horticultural language of legal transplants, one might call these transfers "potted plants":
self-contained organisms that carry their own foundation and sustenance
with them and that, like a houseplant, can be placed anywhere the purchaser desires (and the light is right). Or take commercial arbitration:
another method of dispute resolution that functions relatively independently of existing legal institutions and, in fact, whose hich a conflict is
resolved. Production sharing agreements are a third example of "potted"
transplants: private agreements between foreign investors and a host state
that bypass the local legal system and its pitfalls by rewarding the investor
directly with a percentage of his revenue.18 All three legal innovations are
born from the suspicions, often of foreigners, that local laws are clumsy
and haphazardly applied. All three are based on private ordering as an
alternative to public law reform. In a way, all are signs of failure. If legal
reform imports are slow to take root in barren local soil, impatient customers bring their own solutions in self-contained planters, as it were, that do
not have to rely on local irrigation systems.
3. There is a third type of legal transplant. It resembles my "potted
plants" of the previous section, in the sense that it introduces a truly novel
element into a legal system, but differs from self-contained reform-imports
in that it cannot stay aloof from local legal culture. Antitrust and bankruptcy laws may serve as examples. On the one hand, antitrust and bankruptcy were unknown commodities in most former socialist countries for
which "competition" meant "socialist competition" (understood as winning
15. See Susanne Karstedt, Coming to Terms with the Past in Germany After 1945 and
1989: Public Judgments on Procedure and Justice, 20 LAW & POL'Y 15, 15 (1998).
16.

See Alan Watson, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 95

(1993).
17. See Christian Buihring-Uhle,
NESS 266 (1996).
18. See id. at 56.

ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BusI-
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together rather than against each other) and whose legal systems did not
provide for the exit of failing enterprises but instead expected them to be
bailed out at state expense. Without previous local models for their legislation, designers of Eastern European bankruptcy or antitrust laws can work
on an empty canvas, as it were, and might not feel a need for fitting their
creations into a pre-existing institutional structure. Western advisors, in
particular, excited at the chance to cut new garments from whole cloth,
might suggest bolder, more perfectionist solutions than they could get
away with under the constraints that operate at home. 19 Much of this kind
of legislative work cannot yet be checked against post-socialist reality. The
new laws are designed less to respond to existing market problems than to
contribute to the creation of a market that then, in turn, should generate
the problems that the legislators are addressing. 20 The task is so gigantic
and so novel that even those Eastern European countries with, for instance,
some modest antitrust experience during Socialism have tended not to
draw on that experience in designing their new laws but, like their less
21
progressive neighbors, have essentially started from scratch.
Starting from scratch means one must look for models. Usually,
Western advisors push for the model they are most familiar with-that of
their own respective legal system. With no previous lines marring the
blank slate on which they work, the draftsmen must find it tempting to
design laws that, like Pallas Athena, spring fully clothed and armed from
the heads of their creators. Working from scratch also means that legislatures can provide their new laws with equally new supportive institutions,
such as the antimonopoly commissions that have an important role in
Eastern European antitrust law, 22 the new Ukrainian "State Organ for
Bankruptcy Cases," 23 or the Russian "Financial Monitoring Committee" set
up in 2002 to back up the new anti-money laundering provisions of the
Russian Criminal Code. 2 4 Everywhere in Eastern Europe, a lot of effort,
money, and foreign help is being spent on training new antitrust and bankruptcy experts to administer the reforms.
19. See, e.g., Federal Law on Production Sharing Agreements of 1995, inRuSSIA AND
(John Hazard & Vratislav Pechota trans., Transnational
Juris Publications, 2003).
THE REPUBLICS: LEGAL MATERIALS

20. One example is the Russian Petroleum Legislation Project at the University of
Houston Law Center; see the symposium on the project in 15 Hous. J. INT'L L. 263
(1993); T.W. Walde, Oil and Gas Legislation in Russia; From Texas to Siberia: Is a Russian Model Emerging?, University of Dundee Centre for Petroleum and Mineral Law Policy, Professional Paper, at 6 (1992).
21. See Tibor Varady, The Emergence of Competition Law in (Former) Socialist Countries 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 250 (1999). He cites the Polish Anti-Trust Act of 1990 ("to
ensure the development of competition") and the Russian Anti-Trust Act of 1995 (aiming
for "the creation and efficient functioning of a product markets"). See id.
22. See id. at 261 (noting that "[s]pecific features rooted in socialist heritage are
quite scarce").
23. See id. at 263.
24. See Alexander Biryukov, Bankruptcy and Legislative Reform in Ukraine, 27 REv.
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 581, 595 (2001).

2004

Will Law Reform Travel?

That means that transplants such as antitrust, bankruptcy, or money
laundering laws do not arrive like bare-root plants in their new surroundings but come with at least a little bit of soil clinging to their roots that may
help them grow. Russia's "Financial Monitoring Committee," for example,
25
The
employs more than 400 staff and has a budget of 30 million rubles.

more such soil there is, the more the new reforms are likely to take hold.
Nevertheless, unlike the "potted" transplants, which work by circumventing local institutions and officials, antitrust and bankruptcy reforms
will take root only if they are successfully embedded into their surroundings. Take bankruptcy, for instance. Bankruptcy statutes do not deal only
with the consequences of economic failure. They address many other questions (often implicitly relying on answers that a legal culture has provided
elsewhere): questions about securing credit, concepts of property or contract, social fairness, and moral rights and wrongs. Like a tent fastened by
the stakes that surround it on all sides, a bankruptcy scheme might begin
to wobble if some of the stakes that uphold it break or are left ungrounded.
That means that bankruptcy reforms cannot be designed in splendid isolation.2 6 They are much more susceptible to being undermined by cultural
dissonances than my "potted plants." Despite their "newness" to Eastern
European citizens, bankruptcy or antitrust reforms still must mesh with
the instincts and convictions that former Socialists carry over from their
pasts. That makes the choice of the model from which these law reforms
are copied crucial to their success.
Again, take bankruptcy. In times of fundamental economic change,
the law might want to encourage new beginnings and reward
entrepreneurial risk-taking that for so long had to lay dormant under
Socialism. Thus, Eastern European countries might favor laws modeled
after the American Bankruptcy Code of 1978, which is debtor-friendly and
with its provisions on reorganization, consumer bankruptcy, and debt forgiveness, gives even ordinary citizens the chance to start anew after economic failure. 27 The liberating aspects of America's bankruptcy model
also appeal to Western Europeans: the new German Insolvency Law of
1994, which after much debate entered force in 1999, introduced reorgania court-managed procedure for debt
zation and, for natural persons,
28
Republic.
Federal
the
in
release,
But the German example also shows how tricky it can be to establish
reforms that clash with deeply held cultural convictions. Because, to
Germans, debt forgiveness looks very much like moral capitulation, German creditors have been reluctant to contractually agree to cancel unpaid
25. Olga Sher, Breaking the Wash Cycle: New Money Laundering Laws in Russia, 22
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 627, 640 (2003).

26. Id.
27. On the central role of bankruptcy as a field where many lines of legal concepts
meet and connect, see Christoph G. Paulus, erbindungslinien des modernen Insolvenzrechts, 21 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 2189 (2000).

28. Scott Horton, Bankruptcy Reorganization and the Death of Communism, 5 SURVEY
OF EAST EUROPEAN LAW 3 (1994).

102
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debts. 29 Moreover, the path to court-managed debt forgiveness for natural
persons under the new German law is littered with substantive and procedural obstacles.3 0 Already in the first year of the new law's application,
commentators were calling for "a reform of the reform." 3 1
Disagreement about how to judge a debtor's inability to pay-as evi-

32
It
dence of moral failure or bad fortune-is as old as bankruptcy itself.

seems likely that the views that Eastern European businessmen hold
regarding defaulting debtors come closer to those of their German counterparts than those of their American counterparts. But there are many other
specifically post-socialist obstacles to bankruptcy reform that may require
solutions deviating from both American and European legal models. Can
bankruptcy function in an economic landscape in which a large number of
state and privately owned enterprises technically are insolvent? 33 How
should the law deal with wage claims in legal cultures still committed to a
right to work? What to do about enterprises that in the days of Socialism's
"bigger is better" command economy provided jobs for an entire town?
Will it undermine the curative purposes of bankruptcy law-to sift the
reclaimable enterprises from the hopeless ones-if 90% of bankruptcies in
Russia are creditor-initiated 34 or if 70% of all bankruptcy proceedings in
the Ukraine are brought by government authorities against defaulting tax
35
payers?
Social arrangements, expectations, and notions of right and wrong
will also influence the suitability of antitrust reforms. Spencer Waller
points out that the Sherman Act, much pushed by the American government as a template for Eastern European law reform, 36 is blind to considerations of public welfare 3 7 and therefore, at least in this respect, is ill-suited
to serve new countries in the midst of social upheaval and dislocation.
And could an antitrust model that scrutinizes only private market conduct
(like the Sherman Act) work for an economy in which the main threat to
29. For a survey of the Insolvenzordnung of October 5, 1994, BGBI. 1 1994 p. 2866,
see Klaus Wimmer, Die neue deutsche Insolvenzordnung, 38 JAHRBUCH FOR OSTRECHT 217

(1997).
30. Gerhard Pape, Ein Jahr Verbraucherinsolvenz - eine Zwischenbilanz, 20 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT

2037, 2041 (1999).

31. For example, § 287 para. 2 Insolvenzordnung conditions debt release on a
debtor's surviving an originally seven-year, now six-year, period of "good behavior," during which he must continue to attempt to pay off his creditors.
32. See Thomas Wehr, Zur Notwendigkeit einer "Reform der Reform" der Verbraucherinsolvenz, 20 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT 2000 (1999).
33. See generally BRUCE H. MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE

(2002).

34. Alexander Trunk, Stand und Probleme des Insolvenzrechts in Ost-, Mittelost- und
Sudosteuropa, 38 JAHRBUCH FOR OSTRECHT 233, 238 (1997).

35. Sidney Brooks, Three's A Charm? Russia's Third Bankruptcy Law in Ten Years, 30
INT'L BUS. LAW. 225 (2002).

36. Alexander Biryukov, Bankruptcy and Legislative Reform in the Ukraine, 27 REV.
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 581, 582 (2001).

37. Spencer Waller, Neo-Realism and the InternationalHarmonizationof Law: Lessons
from Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REV. 557, 560 (1994).
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competition will likely come from the government? 38 Will antitrust rules
curb the behavior of businesses accustomed to the informal give-and-take
of an economy steeped in clientelism?
The answers to questions such as these depend upon the vagaries of
economic upturns and downturns, on the speed with which people and
institutions will adjust to new conditions, and on the political support a
country's laws enjoy-all as unpredictable as the weather. Rather than try
to design doctrinally sophisticated and exhaustive laws that could live up
to Western expectations, it might be preferable to aim for what Thomas
Waelde and James Gunderson have called "interim law":39 Legislation that
in a process of trial and error addresses issues provisionally and partially
as they arise and that reconsiders its solutions and expands its reach as
practical experiences and developments suggest. Much Eastern European
reform legislation seems to have followed this strategy. To return to my
two examples: After enacting a first generation of antitrust laws in the early
1990s, most Eastern European countries passed a second generation of
antitrust laws in the second half of the decade. 40 The Ukraine has already
produced two bankruptcy laws;4 1 Russia has reached its third.4 2 It took
this North German expatriate, transplanted to the United States, twenty
years to learn what would and would not grow in her Texas garden. Eastern European legal systems may need even more time.
4. It is easier to explain or predict the success of yet another group of

law reforms in Eastern Europe that one might call "hybrids." Actually, the
horticultural language of transplants does not quite fit the innovations that
I have in mind. They are not necessarily transplants from the West; they
can also be homegrown breeds from the days of Socialism, now domesticated by rule of law constraints and reclaimed for post-socialist use. One
Czech and two Russian institutions can serve as examples: Arbitrazh
Courts, the Russian Procuracy, and the new Commissioner for Civil Rights
of the Czech Republic.
Arbitrazh Courts are the successors of the former Soviet State Arbitrazh, a part judicial, part administrative institution that not only resolved
disputes between state-owned enterprises, but also improved their overall
performance by helping to sort out the many administrative muddles that
were seemingly inevitable in a planned economy. Beginning in 1991, 43 a
series of new laws transformed State Arbitrazh into a system of commercial
courts. The administrative functions of the arbitrators were abolished,
38. Id. at 586.
39. See Roger Alan Boner, Antitrust and State Action in Transition Economies, 43 ANTITRUST BULLETIN

71, 80 (1998).

40. Thomas Waelde & James Gunderson, Legislative Reforms in Transitional Economies: Western Transplants-A Short-Cut to Social Market Economic Status?, 43 INT'L &
COMp. L. Q. 347, 376 (1994).

41. Russell Pittman, Competition Law in Central and Eastern Europe: Five Years Later,
43 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 179 (1998).

42. Alexander Biryakov, Bankruptcy and Legislative Reform in Ukraine, 27 REV. OF
CENT. & E. EUR. L. 581, 581 (2002).
43. Sidney Brooks, supra note 34.
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their investigating powers reduced, and the procedural rights of litigants
expanded. 44 Today, the remodeled courts, staffed with many of the judges
who served as arbitrators under Socialism, adjudicate commercial disputes, bankruptcy cases, and business complaints against administrative
decisions such as fines, the denial of licenses, or confiscations of property. 45 At first, Westerners observed the metamorphosis of Arbitrazh with
deep suspicion. 4 6 But according to recent accounts, it appears that the
erstwhile arbitrators are doing a good job as commercial judges. Commercial disputes are decided very quickly, 4 7 caseloads are increasing, 48 the
parties' trust in the commercial courts is higher than the public's trust in
ordinary courts, 49 and even foreign litigants seem to be treated fairly and
50
in an increasingly sophisticated fashion.
To bring the Soviet Procuracy into the new age seemed an even more
questionable proposition. A Rechtsstaat would need prosecutors to
represent the state in court, especially since Russian criminal procedure
would be enriched with new adversarial elements. But the old Soviet
procurators' other function-"general supervision" over the legality of
administrative decisionmaking-seemed too closely tied to Lenin's monolithic and repressive view of "legal culture" 5 1 and too much at odds with
the new emphasis on individual autonomy and citizen control over the
state to fit into the rule of law. For a while, the procuracy's days seemed
numbered.5 2 In the end, however, the Russian defenders of the procuracy
carried the day. They argued (persuasively, I think) that given Russia's
current instability, it would be reckless to dismantle the country's most
experienced machinery of law enforcement. The procuracy was cleansed
of its repressive features but retained its supervisory authority. 53 Americans might have preferred to assign the role of watchdog over law and
order to the courts alone. But Russian citizens, as yet, are inexperienced
and reluctant litigants. They believe in authority, are more interested in
substantive outcomes than procedures, view the state at least as much as a
resource as a threat, and are used to bringing their grievances to the procu44. See Glenn P. Hendrix, The Experience of Foreign Litigants in Russia's Commercial
Courts, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAw IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 97 (Peter Murrell ed.,
2001).
45. See id. at 98.
46. See Kathryn Hendley, Remaking an Institution: The Transition in Russiafrom State
Arbitrazh to Arbitrazh Courts, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 93, 93 (1998).
47. See Hendrix, supra note 43, at 94.
48. See Kathryn Hendley, "Demand"for Law in Russia-A Mixed Picture, 10 E.EUR.
CONST. REv. No. 4, at 77 n.30 (2001) (reporting that Arbitrazh courts resolve the vast
majority of contractual disputes within two months of filing.)
49. See Hendrix, supra note 43, at 98 (increasing from 208,081 cases in 1994 to

398,622 cases in 1998).
50. See Timothy Frye, The Two Faces of Russian Courts: Evidence from a Survey of
Company Managers, 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV Nos. 1/2, at 126 (2002).
51. See Hendrix, supra note 43, at 102-3.
52. See V.I. Lenin, "Dual" Subordination and Legality, in COLLECTED WORKS 363 (Progress Publishers 2d English ed. 1965).
53. See Gordon B. Smith, The Struggle over the Procuracy, in REFORMING JUSTICE IN
RussIA, 1864-1996 348-49 (Peter H. Solomon ed., 1997).
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rator from the old days. While litigation in Russia is increasingly lawyerdriven and expensive, complaining to the procuracy is "convenient, simple,
accessible, and free."'54 In 1996, the procuracy received about one million
applications from the public that resulted in the discovery of 210,000 viola55
tions of the law, 55,000 of them by central and local government bodies.
No wonder that, in a meeting in January 1997 between representatives of
the Council of Europe and high-level Russian procurators, the Russians
56
It
managed to persuade the Europeans of their continued usefulness.
would be wasteful to cut down a well-established plant that can instead be
pruned to suit the gardener's needs.
Finally, the new Czech ombudsman. 57 Ombudsmen are not socialist
inventions. Originally Scandinavian, the office of ombudsman was first
imported to the U.S. by Hawaii in 1969; since then, a number of other
states have followed suit. 58 Today, all kinds of ombudsmen with varying
tasks and privileges represent citizens' interests in all kinds of settings,
both in the United States and in Europe: in cities, government bureaucracies, corporations, housing authorities, schools, and elsewhere.
But despite their successes under capitalism, there is something decidedly socialist about ombudsmen. Their office is based on the assumption
that ordinary citizens often will be better helped if someone with authority
pushes for their rights than if they have to do so on their own.
Ombudsmen are most often found in institutions aspiring to some sort of
community based on shared goals: universities, hospitals, armies-what
socialists would have called collectives. As under socialist complaint procedures, a citizen needs no attorney to state her case but can raise a grievance informally, at no cost, and often simply by using the telephone; as
under socialism, most complaints submitted to ombudsmen reflect the
dependence and often helplessness of those too weak or too unentitled to
59
use the courts.
What makes an ombudsman so useful as a go-between and broker
between capitalist and socialist legal values, however, is his commitment to
the rule of law. An ombudsman raises legal issues that an ordinary citizen
might not be able to articulate. He is independent of the authorities that he
investigates. He uses his office to enforce the law. The institution of the
ombudsman is a true hybrid: capitalist in its insistence on legality, socialist
in its parental concern for the weak.
54. See Hiroshi Oda, The Emergence of Pravovoe Gosudarstvo (Rechtsstaat) in Russia,
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That is why ombudsmen could be equally useful to pre-capitalist
Poland (which introduced the office in 1988, just barely before curtain-fall,
60
in a last attempt to curb abuses of power by an apathetic administration)
as for the post-socialist Czech Republic (which in 1999 inaugurated its first
"Public Protector of Rights" to assist citizens "lost in the thicket of bureaucracies"). 6 1 Poland's socialist ombudsman (or rather, ombudswoman: the
first commissioner for civil rights was the energetic and fearless law professor Ewa Letowska) was equipped with the right to sue the state6 2 -in the
final days of socialism, a necessary and important tool to advance a
fledgling rule of law. The Czech ombudsman of 1999 uses not litigation
but other means of pressure to advance his clients' interests-by now,
access to court is common enough in the Czech Republic to no longer
appear as the wonder weapon as it did to socialist reformers. Both institutions were and are well suited to assist disoriented and helpless citizens
caught in the midst of social transformations. They are grounded not necessarily in legal institutions of the past, but in the habits and experiences
of people who are used to be taken care of by the state.
5. That brings me to a final type of legal transplant: imports so little
grounded, so out of sync with their new cultural surroundings, that they
seem as likely to take root as an orchid in a cabbage field. A very good
example is the Russian jury. After the experimental introduction of juries
in nine of Russia's 89 regions in 1993, the new Russian Code of Criminal
Procedure of 2001 expanded the right to a jury trial for "very grave
offenses" to all regional courts. 63 What are the chances that Americanstyle juries will grow in Russian soil?
Comparativists should be grateful for the Russian jury because it demonstrates so perfectly what can go wrong with legal transplants. Already,
the initial diagnosis of a problem may be distorted by our inclination to
exaggerate the merits of our own legal culture and to disparage those of
other legal systems. Russian lawyers thus like the idea of juries because it
allows them to draw upon reforms from their own legal past 64 -although it
is not self-evident why the juries of 1864, which challenged the repressiveness of an autocratic rule with at times spectacular acquittals, should
equally be needed in a democratic state. American observers like the idea
of juries because they mistrust the "shocking no-acquittal policy" of Russian criminal courts and the apparently too eager "cooperation" between
60. Hill reports that 30% of all complaints to Hawaii's ombudsman are brought by
prison-convicts, by far the largest group of complainants. Id. at 28. But even the com-

plaints of ordinary citizens mostly concern the needs and worries of people dependent
on the government: welfare clients, tenants in public housing, and the like. Id.
61.
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62. Harald Christian Scheu, Die Stellung des BUrgerrechtsbeauftragtender Tschechischen Republik, 43 MONATSHEFTE FOR OSTEUROPAISCHES RECHT 105, 110 (2001) (citing the
introductory notes to the government draft of the Czech statute).
63. Letowska, supra note 60, at 64.
64. See Stephen C. Thaman, The Resurrection of Trials by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 61, 81-82 (1995).

2004

Will Law Reform Travel?

Russian judges and prosecutors 6 5 and because they hope that the performance of jury duty may foster in Russian citizens a "legal consciousness that,
in turn, benefits the evolution of the rule of law." 66 Judicial statistics seem
to support this view. In 1995, Russian criminal courts acquitted 1.4% of
by Russian
all defendants, 6 7 compared to an acquittal rate of 14.3%
69
juries 68 and an acquittal rate of 14.5% by American juries.
But if we consider that only about three percent of American criminal
cases are decided by jury trial and that the vast majority of prosecutions
result in plea bargains, or in what John Langbein calls "condemnation without adjudication," 70 the American figures just listed change their meaning.
My own calculation, based on a study of felony dispositions in thirty U.S.
counties that includes plea bargains as well as bench and jury trials,
arrives at an overall acquittal rate of 1.4% 7 1-exactly the same as the
acquittal rate of Russian criminal courts in 1995.72 Given the precision of
modern forensic science, high conviction rates should not be a surprise.
Even in criminal justice systems known for their leniency, acquittals are
becoming increasingly rare. In Germany, for instance, the percentage of
acquittals fell from 4.5% in 1976 to 2.7% in 1998. 73 The figures suggest
that the 14.3% acquittal rate of Russian juries (which rose to 22.9% acquittals in 1997!) 7 4 is less a sign of rule of law maturity than, as Stephen

Thaman's report makes seem likely, of ordinary Russians' empathy with
drunkards and the down-and-out. 75 The Russian Supreme Court regularly
reverses about a third of all jury acquittals. 7 6 The Court has also limited
the reach of juries by defining anything but "naked historical facts" as
77
questions of law, including mens rea.
Many Russian judges, law professors and attorneys have shown "a
decided lack of enthusiasm" 78 for the jury. But their objections may be
based on grounds other than lingering Soviet-style disrespect for defendants' rights. Rather, Russian lawyers might simply find the idea of juries
65. See Sarah J. Reynolds, Drawing Upon the Past: Jury Trials in Modern Russia, in
RussIA 374 (Peter H. Solomon ed., 1997)
66. See Stephen Holmes, Introduction, 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV. Nos. 1/2, at 91 (2002).
67. See Stefan Hedlund, Can Property Rights Be Protected by Law?, 10 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. No. 1, at 51 (2001).
68. See Stephen C. Thaman, Europe's New Jury Systems: The Case of Spain and Russia,
62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 257 (1999).
69. See id. at 257.
70. My calculations are based on a study of felony dispositions in 30 counties
between 1980 and 1997. See Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, et al., Are HungJuries a Problem?
21 (National Institute of Justice, 2002).
71. See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78
MICH. L. REv. 204, 204 (1979).
72. See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 69.
73. See Thaman, supra note 67, at 257.
74. Statistisches Bundesamt (ed) Rechtspflege. Fachserie 10. Reihe 3:
Strafverfolgungsstatistik 1976 - 1998 (Wiesbaden, Kohlhammer, 2001).
75. See Thaman, supra note 67, at 257.
76. See Thaman, supra note 63, at 130.
77. See Thaman, supra note 67, at 257.
78. See Irina Dline & Olga Schwartz, The Jury Is Still Out on the Future of Jury Trials
in Russia, 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV. Nos. 1/2, at 108 (2002).
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jarring-going against the grain of the countless unarticulated assumptions, reflexes and habits that make up a legal culture. The Russians would
not be the first civilists to balk at the introduction of adversarial elements
into inquisitorial criminal procedure. In Italy, the 1988 replacement of the
old 1930 code of Criminal Procedure by a new, adversarial model led to
what one critical observer called "the worst of both worlds."'79 In Spain,
the new jury system introduced in 1995 was opposed by many lawyers and
has led to "remarkably few jury trials. 80
I do not want to suggest that civil procedure and common law procedure are so rigidly entrenched in national culture that they can never learn
from one another. For example, exclusionary rules-originally the hallmark of common law procedure which needs to guard against lay jurors'
misjudging the reliability of evidence-can, and have been, integrated into
continental European criminal procedure. "Extrinsic" exclusionary rules,
in particular, have been successfully transplanted: restrictions that are not
meant to improve the probity of evidence (which civil law procedure is not
concerned about because it is dominated by a professional judge) but that
protect more universal values outside the criminal justice process, such as
family cohesion8 1 or the privacy of telephone conversations. 8 2 Plea bargaining, another central feature of American criminal procedure, has also
spread to Europe, where negotiations and "understandings"8 3 between
prosecution and defense increasingly are used to manage growing
caseloads.
Such transplants will be successful only if they do not attack the central convictions of a legal system: its answers to such questions as what is
meant by justice, who can be trusted to achieve it, and what role the individual should play in its pursuit. Americans, coming from what Mirjan
84
Damaska calls a "coordinate model of authority" and a "reactive state,"
do not expect to find the "truth" in criminal court. What they want is
procedural fairness. They think it the individual's own business to stand
up and fight for his rights, believe in the "importance of private over public
social norm enforcement," 8 5 see nothing wrong with bargaining over justice, and mistrust the state. Continental Europeans (both East and West)
are likely to share the values reflected in the "hierarchical" authority structures of an "activist" state.8 6 They hope for substantive rather than formal
justice and expect a good state to provide that justice. Although in many
79. See
80. See
J. CoMP. L.
81. See
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ways more cynical than Americans, Europeans believe that truth can be
uncovered and that it is the court's task to do so. They find bargains over
justice morally offensive. And they trust the state far more than Europe's
totalitarian experiences would lead one to expect.
As a result, adversarial law reform in continental Europe has often
been diverted and undermined by those who apply it in the field. Local
gardeners are trimming back the imports from abroad to make them fit into
the European landscape. Italian judges, for example, believing it their personal responsibility in a criminal trial to aim for a "just and accurate
result," interpret extensively rules of criminal procedure that allow a judge
to sua sponte ask for additional evidence. 8 7 Russian Arbitrazh judges, who
could save time and effort by granting default judgments against unprepared defendants, prefer instead to send them home with the instruction to
produce better evidence for a rescheduled hearing.8 8 German courts curtail "agreements" in criminal court to ensure that a plea bargain, German
style, will not undercut the "central goals of criminal procedure": to
"uncover the truth as completely as possible" 89 and to ensure that
every
punishment truly "matches guilt." 90 The Italian Constitutional Court conditions the validity of plea bargains upon the "proper balance between the
crime and the bargained punishment."9 1
Plea bargaining brings us back to the Russian jury trial. In the United
States, the jury trial could not survive if it were chosen by more than a tiny
number of defendants. Jury trials are too expensive and too time-consuming for everyday use. In fact, it is the very cost of jury trials that makes
guilty pleas such valuable bargaining chips for American defendants. In
Russia, too, jury trials consume huge amounts of money. The experimental juries of the 1990s swallowed up to 25% of their regional courts' budgets, 92 even though less than half of the defendants eligible for jury trial
chose to use that right. 9 3 But the American answer to the high cost of jury
trials-almost unrestricted plea bargaining-flies in the face of civil law
beliefs about uncovering the truth and correctly matching crime and punishment. Plea bargains would curtail the investigative powers of the court
and threaten the growth of another tender plant of Russian law reform: the
presumption of innocence. Although the new Russian Code of Criminal
Procedure provides for summary proceedings with bargaining elements,
these rules apply only to lesser offenses not eligible for jury trial. 94 And I
87. See Dama~ka, supra note 84, at 80.
88. See Grande, supra note 79, at 228.
89. See Hendley, supra note 45, at 104.
90. Bundesverfassungsgericht, supra note 82, at 136 ("m6glichst vollstandige
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have not even begun to talk about the problems of finding jurors among an
exhausted and suspicious citizenry. How did the Russian jury ever
advance so far on the law reformer's drawing boards? In part, I think,
because introducing the jury into continental criminal procedure seemed
like such a noble and romantic goal, conjuring up images of new world
freedom; of self-confident citizens, walking tall; of twelve men good and
true; maybe even of "Twelve Angry Men," because I see no reason to
exclude film and television from the list of inspirations that drive a nation
to remake itself. In Siberia, Stanislaw Pomorski tells us, the participants in
a criminal trial now address the judge as "your honor."9 5 I will not hold
my breath for the equally successful Americanization of Russian juries.
II. Outlook
So where does all this leave us? With some fairly banal and unreliable
rules of thumb about the likely viability of legal transplants. Legal rules
requiring no individual compliance are easily incorporated into foreign
legal systems. Reforms that carry with them their own surroundings ("potted plants") will do better, the more institutional support and personnel
they have and the less dependent they are on local cooperation and
approval. Law reforms that are inconsistent with deeply held moral and
political beliefs may work if they only slightly affect convictions at the
periphery of the local value system. But their success is doubtful if they
contradict fundamental cultural gut reactions. The more complex and multilayered a particular environment, the greater the danger that legal imports
will irritate local sensibilities. For this reason, procedural changes might
be riskier than substantive reform because procedure is based on repetition, role-playing, and tradition ("we've always done it like this") and is
saturated with unspoken assumptions and conditioned reflexes. Finally,
law reform that corresponds to common habits and beliefs or that can connect with institutions and procedures that have performed reasonably well
in the past-grounded change-seems much more promising than change
that had to start from scratch.
The last assertion strikes me as a cause for optimism because I would
count Eastern European courts and the Eastern European legal profession
among the grounded institutions most susceptible to rule-of-law reforms.
Conventional wisdom has it that socialist courts were travesties of justicedominated by Party politics, corrupted by telephone law, and mistrusted
by the public-and that it will take a lengthy learning process for Eastern
European citizens to regain faith in their judicial systems and to respect the
law. Kathryn Hendley, for instance, explains what she calls the "meager
demand" for law in Russia 96 with Russians' everyday experiences under
Socialism: "The idea that law could be used by ordinary citizens . .. to
advance their own interests ... was viewed as unrealistic in the post-Soviet
95. See Irina Dtine & Olga Schwartz, supra note 77, at 107.
96. See Stanislaw Pomorski, In a Siberian Criminal Court, 11 E. EUR. CONST. REV.
Nos. 1/2, at 112 (2002).
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context." 9 7 This statement would be obviously true for the years of Stalinism. But I think it incorrectly describes Eastern European expectations
about the law, both in the years immediately preceding the collapse of
Socialism and in the years that followed the collapse. True, pre-1989 civil
litigation rates stayed low in Eastern Europe despite the fact that, under
Socialism, courts usually were easily accessible, cheap, fast, and fairly userfriendly. But it was not distrust that kept potential plaintiffs out of court.
It was the fact that, in a planned economy (in which money is not very
valuable), businesses did not care all that much about enforcing debts
against defaulting citizens and that ordinary citizens (who did care about
their rights) had little property to sue about and could not contest administrative decisions in court. Large numbers of ordinary citizens did use the
avenues by which socialist citizens could lodge complaints against those in
authority-the procuracy, the Party, newspaper complaint desks, and the
like-but again, not, as I assume, because they trusted any of these institutions, but because complaints are useful legal mechanisms by which someone dependent can implore, persuade, and pester someone in control into
satisfying his requests.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Eastern European litigation rates shot
up. Many of the new users of the courts were business people. In Hungary, first-instance contract disputes increased by 60% between 1990 and
1992.98 In Russia, litigation in the new Arbitrazh courts doubled between
1997 and 2002. 99 Ordinary people have used new ways of fighting for
their rights as they have become available (for instance, since Russian
courts acquired the authority to review the legality of pre-trial detentions,
17% to 19% of all detainees have contested their arrests) 10 0 and have
stayed with the old and familiar ways of looking for redress if they seem
cheaper and less onerous (such as complaining to the procuracy). As
Erhard Blankenburg suggests, the explanation for the frequency of litigation is more likely found on the supply side than on the demand side of the
law. 10 1 Trust does not seem to have a lot to do with it. Americans trust
their courts less than the medical profession and the police but more than
the media,10 2 with lawyers ranking near the bottom of the scale of various
professions, scarcely more respectable than car sales people. 10 3 Eastern
Europeans' trust in courts is also in the middling range, with courts generally doing better than the police or the unions, worse than the army or the
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101. See Peter H. Solomon & Todd Foglesong, COURTS AND TRANSITION IN RUSSIA 71
(2000).
102. See Erhard Blankenburg, Civil Litigation Rates as Indicatorsfor Legal Cultures, in
COMPARING LEGAL CULTURES 41, 53 (D. Nelken ed., 1997).
103. How the Pubiic Views the Courts, 1999 WASHINGTON STATEWIDE SURVEY COMPARED
TO A1999 NATIONAL SURVEY 13-15 (GMA Research Corp., 1999) [hereinafter Washington
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church, and very much better than "foreign experts." 10 4 Nowhere, it
seems, does the law inspire much consumer satisfaction. Over 62% of
Americans are convinced that courts favor corporations over individual
plaintiffs and most believe that they treat wealthy people better than the
rest. 10 5 Trust or no trust, Americans will use the law whenever they expect
it to advance their interests. We can assume Eastern European citizens to
do the same.
Rather than their popularity, it is their frame of mind that makes lawyers of all kinds rank among the most promising allies for reform in Eastern Europe. Capitalism comes more naturally to lawyers than to other
former socialists. The rule of law and capitalism are based on many of the
same assumptions: a belief in individual autonomy, in the security of
rights, and in playing by the rules; a preference for negotiated over state
imposed solutions; and distrust of the government. Even lawyers coming
from modest doctrinal training programs will have learned skills that are
badly needed in the Rechtsstaat: close reading of texts, analogical reasoning, bargaining, following procedure, and looking at an issue from both
sides. Lawyers were somewhat amphibious creatures under Socialism.
They were more closely linked to political power than many other servants
of the state but were also equipped with intellectual tools that enabled
them to question the state's power better than others could; part ideologues and part professionals; neither quite fish nor fowl.
My own research on East German legal history 10 6 suggests an inverse
relationship between socialist lawyers' political and legal faith. In the early
years of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), when utopian hopes for
a new type of society ran high, East German lawyers and judges (then,
mostly minimally trained "people's judges") had little use for careful legal
argument. But as the image of a socialist utopia faded, legal professionalism gained strength. If you no longer believe that your ideology can provide the answers to important social questions, you need to rely on formal
rules to find them. Doubt in the predictability of outcomes breeds trust in
procedure. By the early 1980s, when barely anyone in the GDR seemed
any longer to believe in Socialism, East German courts and lawyers had
become far more finicky about the law than ever before. They worried
about the reliability of proof in criminal proceedings, 10 7 false confessions, 10 8 and the unwarranted pre-trial detention of alleged offenders. 10 9
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In East Germany, the rule of law grew its first shoots before the collapse of
Socialism.
The same, I think, is true for Eastern Europe. As political faith
decreased, legal faith grew stronger. In Poland, judicial review of administrative decisions was introduced a decade before the fall of Socialism in a
time of political unrest and disappointment. 110 Also in the 1980s, high
courts in Russia began to push for the greater "exactitude"' I of trial court
decisions and to use their supervisory authority to limit the percentage of
prison sentences for criminal defendants.' 12 Liberalization efforts such as
these could fill the void left by crumbling ideological convictions with
pride in professional craftsmanship. The most likely proponents of reform
were those best educated: high court judges, senior prosecutors, and law
professors. As it is today, law reform under Socialism was initiated from
above. But it left Eastern European courts, on the eve of capitalism, far
more susceptible to rule-of-law reforms than they would have been in earlier decades. This may explain why Russian Arbitrazh judges appear to be
doing a good job in their new roles as commercial judges,' 1 3 why Russian
judges in general seem less corrupt than is normally assumed, 1 4 and why
the biggest success stories of post-socialist law reform are the new constitutional courts in Eastern Europe, 1 5 staffed with the legal elite of Socialism.
Yet-to return to transplants-the triumph of Eastern European constitutional courts can also be explained with their "potted" quality: they came
as new, self-contained institutions, equipped with separate budgets, staffed
with judges that did not belong to the traditional judicial bureaucracy, and
charged with many tasks (such as abstract review) that did not require the
cooperation of ordinary citizens.
In any case, Eastern European courts and lawyers, I believe, are among
the most promising allies of post-socialist reform. Eastern European governments seem to share this view. 1 16 Those that do not may find themselves put on the defensive by new and imaginative uses of the law. Here is
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one example: 117 In 1996, the Belarus Constitutional Court, which under
President Lukaschenka has to bear more than its share of troubles, lost a
number of its previous rights through a Lukaschenka-initiated referendum.
The Court's remaining caseload began to shrink. But Belarus citizens continued to submit to the Court socialist-style complaints asserting the violation of rights that the Court had no actual power to protect. Initially, the
justices would write a letter to the offending office or institution, suggesting reasons why it should honor the citizen's request. Then, in 1998,
the Court began to publicize those responses: first, just by including them
in its register of cases; then-since 2000-by formally publishing the decisions in the Belarus Official Gazette. The Court still does not have the
power to enforce its rulings. But it combines a traditional Soviet device
(the paternalistic response to a citizen's essentially toothless complaint)
with a rule of law device (publicity) to assert its authority and, thereby,
perhaps make inroads into the lawlessness of Eastern Europe's most autocratic state. This combination of old and new, homegrown and imported,
strikes me as a good example of how transplants may slowly and fitfully
turn around an entire legal system.
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